1980's, it was still possible to write that, "reform of the economy--and the predominance of market-oriented institutions and behavior that this would usher in--[was not] a goal in itself." 2 But by the end of the 1990's, with stark economic threats at hand, marketization and even the dissolution of a significant amount of the state ownership of the economy had become just that, goals in themselves. And as party and state chiefs gave the go-ahead to massive sales of state assets, bankruptcy of state firms, and shedding of state employees to boost enterprise efficiency, the very essence of what socialism has meant in China came under serious challenge.
I consider how the recent agenda of reforms pertaining to ownership, employment, and citizenship measure up against the situation in these areas at three benchmarks: 1949, 1979, and 1989 . In broad brush, this is a story of abolishing and then of allowing difference, as private sphere and peasant laborer were first turned into outcast, pariah in the municipalities--replaced by the solitary presence there of the state sphere and the permanent urbanite worker--but then later permitted to reappear.
Thus, the '50's were a time of progressive homogenization, elimination of disparity and erection of partitions; in the '60's and '70's that drive became fully realized and deeply, ideologically, entrenched. With the '80's, diversity gingerly reemerged. But it has only been in the '90's that the partitions appear to be truly in the midst of demolition. 3
The Recent Agenda Ownership Most prominently, Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin put forward two critical chores at the 1997 congress: to "adjust and improve the ownership structure," and to "accelerate the reform of state-owned enterprises." 4 Together these orders amounted to placing an authoritative imprimatur upon "economies of diverse ownership," such as the joint-stock system, now said to be by the following summer the State Economic and Trade Commission issued a notice against selling small state firms, as the top party leadership split over the extent of permissible privatization. 9 Labor For the workers whose firms could no longer accommodate them, layoffs were to become standard practice to enhance productivity, while efforts were to be made to divert these people to other posts. The hope was that, cut off from their employers and thrown into society, dismissed workers would look to the private and tertiary sectors. Thus, what began as "enterprise restructuring" could also "readjust the industrial structure," 10 eventually "causing the flow of labor to follow the laws of the market economy." 11 Obviously, the sacred tie long binding the worker to his/her danwei is in the course of being cut; labor mobility must be on its way.
Meanwhile, a 1995 Reemployment Project, geared to handle the retraining, basic livelihood, and provision of new positions for the laid-offs, had its charge grossly expanded. 12 If successful, the Project could be the wedge that forces a shift from allocating labor to marketizing it; from state and collectively-owned enterprises' dominance to more non-governmental firms;
and from contracted to flexible forms of employment. 13 9 SWB F/3278, S1/2, from Xinhua (XH), July 11, 1998; Lo Ping, "Wenjian toulou qigai xian pingjing" [ China Daily, April 26, 1995, 1 on its inauguration. 13 Liu Zhonghua, "Guanyu zaijiuye gongcheng yu laodongli shichang jianshe di sikao" [Thoughts on the Reemployment But more immediately, unemployment became so acute--with at least 13 million laid-offs by the end of 1997 14 --with several million more since 15 --that in May 1998 a national conference proclaimed the distribution of basic living allowances and on-time payment of pensions the number one priority. 16 These pleas signal the extent to which local officials--in so rapidly divesting money-losing state property, and in tolerating massive firings of workers--have rushed to marketize. 17
Citizenship
Another rampart in the midst of collapse is the one separating permanent urban workers from laborers from the countryside hired temporarily in the cities. In 1998, Shanghai scholars judged that, "From the 1990's, the isolation between local and outside labor has been broken."
They find three causes: enterprise reform, which enlarged managers' hiring autonomy; market competition, which presses them to use cheap labor; and layoffs of city factory hands, which force urbanites to take low-paying jobs. The upshot is that the two strands of the original dual labor market may be recombining in novel ways. Peng Xizhe, Zheng Guizhen, and Chen Yuexin, "Chanye jiegou tiaozhengzhong di Shanghai fangzhiye wailai nuxing renkou" [Shanghai's Moreover, in both 1997 and 1998, the seemingly impenetrable wall of status superiority of the city-born hoisted around 1961 19 via the household registration (hukou) system--which defined urban citizenship--was pierced with some crucial regulatory shifts. In 1997, in 450 select, "advanced" county-level towns, peasants pursuing legal, stable occupations who had been resident for two years, were granted an urban hukou, complete with the right to send their children to school at subsidized rates. They also became eligible for basic health and welfare benefits. 20
In 1998, children got the right to inherit the hukou of either parent; and "peasant" spouses already resident over a number of years in a city could adopt their urban spouse's registration, as could retirees moving in with their city offspring. Moreover, rural investors who sponsored enterprises or purchased commercial housing in cities and their immediate families could obtain urban registration so long as they had legal, stable residences and occupations. 21 So the purity of official urban existence promises to be steadily diluted.
Thus in three facets of the urban political economy--ownership, labor, and citizenship--in the late 1990's, the core divisions that had delimited urbanism were blurring, even threatening to disappear. At just how different a pass were these institutions from where they had been 10, 20, and 50 years before? Through the 1980's ownership by the state was challenged along three different paths: enterprise reform; a set of "capitalistic practices"; and the steady expansion of the private sector.
In the efforts at enterprise reform, however, two flaws were outstanding: none really challenged ownership, and there were no effective governance mechanisms. The Chinese University Press, 1995), 25.31.
sector was certainly largely private as well; 41 meanwhile, a category called "other," containing foreign-invested industry--amounting to just 1.2 percent in 1985--had expanded to 16.6 percent. 42
Competition from non-state producers and a more marketized environment combined to undermine the state sector by the 1990's much more than organizational tampering alone could do. 43 As that sector's shrinkage proceeds, the boundaries between it and other sectors are becoming far less significant than they used to be.
Labor
Among the fundamental urban goals of the Party in 1949 were to realize full employment, job security replete with benefits, minimal income and life style differences, and comfortable consumption standards for all residents. 44 The leadership therefore shepherded the population into state and "collectively"-owned firms; by mid-1956, 85 percent of the personnel in commerce had been "transformed"; at year's end, 99 percent of the staff and workers of private industrial concerns were working in public-private joint firms. 45
Within less than a decade after taking over, the country's new leaders had replaced a world of workshops, where jobs were insecure and unemployment frequent, wages low and welfare benefits absent, with cities marked by large, modern firms that in every way fulfilled their plans. 46 43 Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); idem., "China's Economy," 275. 44 Whyte and Parish, op. cit., 16. 45 Solinger, Chinese Business, 308. A population that had been highly mobile geographically found its movement strictly controlled, as urban workers were sorted into danwei, from which they virtually never departed. 47
Though a hierarchy of urban industrial labor emerged, with three distinct statuses enjoying differing levels of pay, benefits, and work security, urbanites as a group received adequate and roughly comparable wages, subsidized housing, and other public goods. 48 48 Walder, "The Remaking," 28-38; Naughton, "China," 25. Law demanded contracts for all employees, its implementation was overtaken by the growing push to downsize which followed in its wake. But urban labor exchange centers appeared for skilled workers, and it became possible to take short-term unpaid leaves. Still, despite these moves in the direction of shattering the famous "iron rice bowl," work for all with life-long tenure remained the norm at the end of the '80's. 55
Once the '90's got underway, however, as official job assignments were reduced, personal connections played an increasingly dominant role in job-seeking. 56 Meanwhile the danwei's control of careers diminished with an incipient labor market and new freedom to find positions. 57
In Shanghai from 1985 to 1995 the percentage of urbanites assigned jobs by labor departments dropped from 28 to 18, as those locating jobs on their own escalated from nine to 19 percent; Dismissing and laying off workers is a move against our will taken when we have no way to turn for help, but also the only way to extricate ourselves from predicament. 65 This acquiescence in allowing market forces to play themselves out has once again recast the subdivisions within the working class. The lines are no longer drawn by residence (urban versus rural) and the possession of a permanent, state-sector job, 66 as they had been into the early '90's.
Instead, with wages in the state sector slipping below those outside it, and with job security sacrificed to competition, gross disparities segregate workers even within the state sector, in accord with firms' economic success. 67
The 1995 Ninth Five Year Plan unveiled an employment policy aimed at accelerating the development of the non-state economies and the tertiary sector (both erased in the 1950's); giving vigorous support to small and medium firms, the mainstay of the pre-1949 economy; obliterating boundaries distinguishing different kinds of workers; encouraging workers to transfer jobs across enterprises, trades, and regions; and urging the urban unemployed to do the work once done just by migrant peasant workers. 68 Thus the top leadership has fully legitimated a return to an urban labor market that its predecessors had eradicated decades ago.
Citizenship
In pre-1949 China, cities and countryside formed a continuous web, with no separation between their populaces. 69 But beginning with injunctions in 1952 discouraging ruralites from entering municipalities--as millions did so 70 --followed by increasingly harsh and ultimately effective repatriations of peasants from towns in 1955, 1957, and 1961, the cities became pretty much devoid of farmers for about two decades. The borders barring outsiders from becoming residents, enforced by rigid registration checks, food rationing and governmentally-assigned jobs and housing, forged a clear distinction between those of the metropolis and those who were not.
With the fall of the communes, the reactivation of commerce and services, and the stimulation to urban construction, by 1983 the regime granted the "floating population" the right to inhabit temporarily in urban areas, at first under quite restrictive conditions. Throughout the '80's progressively more lenient regulations, plus increasingly flourishing markets, steadily undermined the barriers that had made city dwelling impossible for peasants before. 71
Eventually "villages" of co-locals congealed in large cities, where outsiders from the same native place shared space and occupations. Their presence lent a richness and diversity to the sizable metropolis that had been wanting there for at least thirty years. Given the booming economy into the '90's, the overwhelming majority found work and a place of abode. Despite their lack of power and fundamental legitimacy, and the uncertainty over their ongoing right to remain through the `90's, considerable economic variation developed among them, with some remarkably wealthy by the '90's. 72
Is the bulwark against rural outsiders disintegrating; has city citizenship become a nonexclusive category available to all residents? As the PRC turns fifty, this would be claiming too much. The Ninth Plan's aim to coordinate urban and rural workers in one grand job market 73 defies realization. For the wave of unemployment washing across the country since 1997 has affected treatment of migrant workers. Major cities--though usually incapable of staunching the
